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Abstract 
This paper uses data of Chinese public companies from 2004-2015 to 
test the relationship between government inspectors’ penalties and customer 
loyalty of investment bank. The test results show that penalties from 
government inspectors would damage the reputation of investment bank and, 
thus, result to a decline in its market competitiveness. If the investment bank 
gets penalties, IPO customers would probably change the underwriters if they 
want to do Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO). This, therefore, result to a decline 
in the customer loyalty of investment bank. This negative impact of penalties 
on customer loyalty is more significant to the investment bank that has high 
reputation.  
 
Keywords: Government inspectors’ penalties, customer loyalty of investment 
banks, reputation 
 
1. Introduction  
Investment bank is one of the most important financial intermediaries in 
the capital market. The quality of equity that was underwritten by investment 
bank has a significant impact on the development of financial market. Some 
researches show that the equity underwritten by investment banks with high 
reputation normally has low earnings management level and low IPO-
underpricing on the first day, but the long-term return of this equity is high 
(Carter, Dark & Singh, 1998; Jo et al., 2007; Chang et al., 2010). Hiring 
investment bank with high reputation could help companies to send a positive 
signal to the open market, reduce the information asymmetry between issuers 
and investors, and increase issuing price and lower the cost of financing. 
Investment bank could also expand market share and generate high 
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underwriting fee. Normally, investment bank with high reputation has higher 
level of customer loyalty. 
 The penalties from government inspectors is one important signal of 
reputation damage. According to the previous research, after the investigation 
of SEC, the market share of investment bank would decrease dramatically. 
This paper makes use of the sample of penalties of China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) on investment banks and its sponsors 
between 2004-2015. This is aimed at investigating the issuers’ reaction to 
these penalties and analyzing the impact of penalties on customer loyalty. The 
results show that after getting the penalties from government inspectors, the 
IPO customers of investment bank are more likely to change their 
underwriters. The impact is more significant for high-reputation investment 
banks. 
 The contributions of this paper include: firstly, this paper provide 
empirical evidence to prove that penalties do have effect on the reputation of 
investment bank. The penalties of government inspectors provide useful 
information to the public to assess the quality of underwriting services 
provided by different investment banks and therefore help the functioning of 
the investment bank’s reputation mechanism. Secondly, the previous papers 
that show the relationship between reputation and customer loyalty of 
investment banks have the problem of endogenous choice between public 
companies and investment banks. Introducing penalties which are exogenous 
events could help solve this problem. 
 This paper is structured as follows: section two will introduce Chinese 
investment banks and the regulations of Chinese government; section three 
will critically review the previous literatures and section four will state the 
research hypothesis; the data, methodology and empirical results will be 
explained in section five. This paper will close with a small conclusion. 
 
2. Regulatory Background 
 In the process of the development of Chinese Security market, the role 
played by investment bank has changed significantly. Before 1999, the issuing 
of securities must be approved by the government. With this rule, investment 
bank barely did their job. Local government played an important in the process 
of choosing the company that went public. Thus, the issuing price of securities 
was based on the profits or expected profits and fixed PE ratio. There was little 
the investment bank could do to choose the company or set the price. The 
major work done by the investment bank at that time was to help the company 
restructure and underwrote its securities. Between 1999-2003, investment 
bank recommended the company to go public and negotiate the issuing price 
with customers. Consequently, the issuing price must be approved by CSRC. 
Since 2004, the application of sponsor mechanism started. Both sponsor and 
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investment bank are responsible for recommendation work. The job of 
investment bank include guidance of the work before going public, 
recommendation, underwriting, setting issuing prices, and providing 
continuous guidance after going public.  
 In order to increase the quality of underwriting services provided by 
investment bank, government inspectors have set a series of rules and 
guidance. According to the regulations, if investment bank provides false or 
mis-leading statement or missed any important message during underwriting, 
issuing and trading process, it will be warned or fined. The illegal gains would 
be confiscated and the security business license will be suspended or 
cancelled. In the “Securities Act” published in 1999, criminal liability and 
civil compensation were included in the penalties of investment banks. Since 
2004 when sponsor system was introduced, the regulation and penalties of 
sponsor were clearly stated. There are empirical cases for the previous 
regulation and laws; however, how do these regulations impact the investment 
bank? Hence, there are limited researches that discuss this issue. This paper 
focuses on answering this question.  
 
3. Literature Review  
Beatty et al. (1998) used 29 investigation cases of SEC as a sample to 
discuss the effects of reputation damage on investment banks. The research 
shows that after being investigated by the government inspectors, the market 
share of IPO underwriter decreased significantly and the time duration from 
registration to successfully issuing shares increased significantly. The share 
price of similar-size competitors of investment banks dropped and the 
volatility of previous customers’ share prices increases. Moreover, the IPO 
underpricing of customers on the first day was significantly higher. Once the 
investigation information was exposed, the share price of underwriters’ IPO 
customers dropped. Song and Uzun (2004) investigate the effects of 
customers’ financial fraud on the share price of IPO underwriters within five 
years. The findings show that the exposure of financial fraud of customers has 
a negative effect on the shared price of its underwriters. The higher the loss 
caused by the financial fraud, the longer the hidden period of financial fraud. 
On the other hand, the higher the proportion of financial fraud customer, the 
more heavily the fall of underwriter’s share price. At the same time, the more 
the sue cases of customers, the more significant the negative effects on the 
underwriters. This research indicates that the financial frauds of customers 
have significant effects on the underwriters’ reputation. Chunling Huang 
(2005) used the case of Macat to discuss the effect of false listing on the 
underwriters. She found that after the exposure of false listing, the market 
share of China Southern Securities fell significantly. Chen et al. (2011) 
investigated the effects on the underwriters if their customers were found to 
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have financial frauds within three years after IPO. They found that if the 
customers were involved in financial frauds, the market share of their 
underwriters would decrease significantly and the approval time of their next 
customers IPO would increase.  
The literatures show that if the previous customers are found to have 
financial frauds or the underwriters are investigated by government inspectors, 
the market shared and the market value of underwriters will decrease 
significantly. This paper will expand the research and discuss the effect of 
government inspectors’ penalties on customer loyalty. Beatty’s et al. (1998) 
research compared the change of different index before and after the 
investment banks was investigated by the government inspectors. However, 
they did not compare it with the control group which indicates that their results 
might be affected by the mixed events. Furthermore, we apply the difference-
in-difference model to investigate the effects of penalties on investment banks.   
 
4. Research Hypothesis 
 Good reputation is the solid foundation for the development of any 
agency. The investors prefer an investment bank with high reputation to lower 
the risk of information asymmetry and thus, lower issuers’ cost of capital. 
Good issuers are more likely to hire investment banks with high reputation to 
send positive signal to the market and lower the cost of financing. Therefore, 
customer loyalty of high-reputation investment banks is normally higher. 
 When the reputation is damaged, the market will punish the agencies. 
Beatty’s et al. (1998) research shows that after SEC published its investigation 
results, the market share of the investment would decrease significantly. Both 
Chen et al. (2011) and Chunling Huang (2005) found that the accounting 
frauds of public companies will damage the investment banks that help them 
go public and reduce the investment bank’s market share. 
 After IPO, the relationship-type capital was built between underwriters 
and issuers. Hence, this makes the issuers prefer the IPO underwrite to carry 
out SEO for them. In addition, this reflects the value of the relationship-type 
capital of underwriters. Krigman et al. (2001) found that the higher the 
reputation of IPO underwriters, the lower the possibility that IPO customer 
would switch the underwriters. Jianghui Liu (2010) found that Chinese 
Companies are more loyal to the underwriters that have high reputation.  
 Fernando’s et al. (2005) research shows when the companies decide to 
do IPO or SEO. Therefore, the higher the variance between changes of ranking 
of issuers’ financing scale and changes of the ranking of underwriter’s 
reputation, the higher the possibility of changing underwriters. The reputation 
of investment bank would be damaged after being fined by the government 
inspectors. In order to ensure the SEO process, it is more likely for the 
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customer to change the underwriters. Therefore, the research hypothesis is 
given below: 
 H1: The IPO customer is more likely to change the investment bank if 
the bank get the penalties from government inspectors. The possibility of 
changing the investment bank will be higher if the reputation of this bank is 
high. 
 
5. Data, Methodology and Empirical Results 
This paper collected CSRC’s penalty events or cases of sponsors or 
investment banks from 2004 to 2015. During this period, the total number of 
penalties is 54 and they cover 29 sponsor agencies or investment banks.  
 As shown in Table 1, panel A summarized all the penalty cases of the 
investment banks. In 28 cases, the penalty was warning letter or regulatory 
talks. Thus, this kind of penalty will not influence the investment banks’ 
business. In 4 cases, CSRC paused the business of investment bank for three 
months. This kind of penalty will influence the public application of its 
customers and thus negatively affect investment banks’ business. Panel B 
summarizes the penalties of sponsor that worked for investment banks. In 
total, 99 persons were punished. 51 of them had regulatory talks and the 
business of 29 persons were paused. 19 sponsors’ licenses were cancelled and 
they were not allowed to enter into the security market any more.  
Table 1. The summary of CSRC’s penalties between 2004-2015 
PANEL A Penalties to investment banks  
Warning letter or regulatory talks 24 
Pause business for 3 months 4 
Total 28 
PANEL B Penalties to individual sponsors 
 
Warning letters or regulatory talks 51 
Pause business for 3/6/9/12 months 29 
License cancelled and prohibit from entering the market 19 
Total 99 
  
 The samples used in this study were companies that did RS or SEO 
within 5 years after going public during 2004-2015. The initial number of the 
sample is 579. The companies that went public before 2004 or missed 
underwriter information were excluded. The feature data of IPO and SEO of 
32 companies are missing, which is also excluded in this research. Only the 
first SEO after IPO are used, which exclude 104 companies which has twice 
or more SEOs. 26 IPO are excluded because they were not approved by CSRC. 
The final number of observation is 421. 
 According to Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and Yang (2012), this 
paper built a difference-in-difference model: 





Subsequently, the variables are described below:  
 CHANGE: If the company changes the underwriter when they do 
SEO, the value is 1, otherwise, the value is 0.  
 PUNISH: If the investment bank got punished, the value is 1, 
otherwise the value is 0. This variable is used to control the differences in 
change probability between the investment banks that got punished and those 
that were not punished. POST is the main test variable. For the year that the 
investment bank got punished and three years after, the value is 1, otherwise 
the value is 0. This variable is used to test the effect of punishment events on 
customer loyalty of investment bank, compared to those investment banks that 
did not get punished at year t. 
PUNISH_PER: If the sponsor of investment bank got punished by 
CSRC (exclude the situation when both investment bank and its sponsors got 
punished), the value is 1, otherwise the value is 0. POST-PER is the main test 
variable. For the year that the sponsor got punished and three years after, the 
value is 1, otherwise the value is 0. This variable is used to test the effect of 
punishment events on investment bank, compared to those investment banks 
whose sponsors were not punished. YEAR is a year dummy variable which is 
used to control the changing process of IPO underwriters’ charging fee. 
UNDERWRITER is an investment bank dummy variable which is used to 
control the fixed effect of investment banks on its charging fee.  
If the investment bank and its sponsors got punishment at different 
point in time, when the punishment event occurs, the punished investment 
bank is regarded as the treatment group. Other investment banks that were not 
punished at year t is the control group. The parameters of variable POST and 
POST_PER measures the effect of punishment events on the investment banks 
that got punishment, compared to those that were not punished.  
The controllable variables include: CHGREPU which is the changes 
of investment bank’s ranking when they did IPO and SEO for the customer. 
The ranking of investment bank is dependent on the total revenue of 
underwriting (including IPO and SEO) for the previous three years. Femando 
et al. (2005) found that the higher the reputation of investment bank, the lower 
the possibility for the customer to change the underwriter when they carry out 
SEO. SAMERPROV is 1 if the registration place of investment bank is the 
same as the public company, otherwise it is 0. This variable aims to control 
the geographic effects on customers’ choice of underwriters.  
The feature variable of issuers: RETFD refers to the decrease/increase 
of share price on the first day of IP. This variable is, however, used to control 
the effect of the performance of underwriters on customer choice. The longer 
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the period which measures the duration of IPO (the public day) and SEO 
(declare day), the less important is the relationship-type capital between 
investment bank and public company. This means the possibility of customer 
to change the underwriter is higher (James, 1992); SEOPROED is the natural 
logarithm of financing scale of SEO. Therefore, the larger the scale, the higher 
the bargaining power of customer, and the more likely customers will change 
the underwrite (Krigman et al., 2001). The financial data of issuers include 
(based on previous year): Return on equity (ROE), natural logarithm of total 
assets (SIZE), and closing share price of previous year to the closing balance 
of net asset per share (PB). These variables are used to control the effect of the 
performance of customer companies based on its decision to change the 
underwriter (Fernando et al., 2005). Finally, this model control the years and 
investment banks as dummy variables.  
Table 2 is the statistic description of CSRC’s regulation and changes 
of underwriter when the companies do SEO. Among 421 sample, 249 
companies (59%, change group) changed their underwriters, while 172 
companies (41%, non-change group) did not change. Within change group, 
53% of the underwrites had got the penalties during the period (2004-2015). 
In non-change group, 62% of the underwrites had got the penalties during the 
period (2004-2015). It shows that more underwriters among the non-change 
group had been punished. Among those 249 companies that had changed the 
underwriters when they perform SEO, 34% of SEO were within three years 
after the underwriters were punished. In non-change group, this percentage is 
28%. More companies in change group had changed their SEO underwriter 
within three years. Nevertheless, the variance is not significant. The variance 
between the ranking of underwriter when the customer does IPO and SEO 
(CHGREPU) is significantly lower in the change group, compared to the non-
change group. That means the higher the reputation of underwriter, the less 
likely customers will change the underwriter when they perform SEO. In terms 
of the variable that measures whether the issuers and IPO underwriter are in 
the same place (SAMEPROV), non-change group is 22%. Thus, this is higher 
than change group, but the variance is not significant. The duration of the time 
(LNPERD) of change group is significantly higher than non-change group. 
There is no significant difference between the change of share price on the 
first date (RETFD) of the change group and non-change group. It is the same 
for the financing scale and total asset scale. In terms of ROE, non-change 
group is significantly higher than change group. Change group has a higher 
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Table 2. Statistic description of the variance between change group (249 companies) and 
non-change group (172 companies)  
Change group（249） Non-change group（172） 
  
Variable mean p50 mean p50 t z 
PUNISH 0.53 1 0.62 1 1.87* 1.87* 
POST 0.34 0 0.28 0 1.22 1.22 
PUNISH_PER 0.55 1 0.60 1 0.91 0.91 
POST_PER 0.20 0 0.26 0 1.26 1.36 
REPU 0.45 0 0.51 1 1.05 1.05 
CHGREPU 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 2.03** 1.69 
SAMEPROV 0.18 0 0.22 0 0.91 0.91 
PERIOD 7.37 7.38 7.08 7.13 6.56*** 6.03*** 
RETFD 88.96 62.19 85.13 51.98 0.42 0.8 
SEOPROED 20.15 20.09 20.13 20.08 0.28 0.22 
ROE_SEO 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.11 3.02*** 2.95*** 
SIZE_SEO 21.35 21.11 21.33 21.27 0.3 0.49 
PB_SEO 4.03 3.21 4.66 4.02 2.34** 2.68*** 
 
 Table 3 shows the regression result. The parameters of POST shown 
in the first column are positive. This indicates that compared to other SEO 
which happens within three years since the underwriter got punished, the 
issuers would change the underwriters. This is consistent with the expectation. 
The parameters of POST_PER is not significant, which means the effects of 
the penalties of sponsors on the changes of SEO underwrites is limited. The 
parameters of REPU*POST have a positive significant value and the 
parameters of POST are no longer significant. Thus, this indicates that 
compared to the underwriters with low reputation, the IPO customers are more 
like to change the underwriters with high reputation after penalties. The impact 
of penalties on the investment bank that has high reputation is higher. The 
parameters of POST_PER in the second column have a negative significant 
value and the parameters of REPU*POST_PER have a positive significant 
value. This means that for the investment bank that has low reputation, the 
penalty would not negatively affect the sponsors and it would lower the 
possibility of changing the underwriter. However, the negative impact is 
higher to the investment bank with high reputation.  
 Among the controllable variables, the parameter of CHGREPU is 
negative, which means the more the underwriter increase its reputation, the 
less the customer would change the underwriter. This results indicate that the 
changes of underwriter’s reputation is important to the customers’ choice of 
SEO underwriters. The parameter of PERIOD is positive, which means the 
longer the duration between SEO and IPO, the easier the customer would 
change the underwriter. The parameter of ROE is positive, which means if the 
profitability of customer is higher, it is less likely for them to change the SEO 
underwriter. The parameter of RETFD is positive but not significant. 
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Consequently, this is consistent with the results of previous literatures. There 
is not cause and effect relationship between IPO underpricing on the first day 
and the changes of SEO underwriter.  
Table 3. Regression result 
 (1) (2) 
 CHANGE CHANGE 
PUNISH_INST -0.595 0.151 
 (-0.29) (0.12) 
POST 0.851** -0.747 
 (2.10) (-0.88) 
PUNISH_PER 0.330 1.629 
 (0.18) (1.25) 
POST_PER -0.433 -2.210** 
 (-1.04) (-2.00) 
REPU  -0.835 
  (-0.65) 
REPU*POST  1.938** 
  (2.12) 
REPU*POST_PER  2.159* 
  (1.81) 
CHGREPU -3.451** -3.314** 
 (-2.25) (-2.09) 
SAMEPROV -0.044 -0.097 
 (-0.12) (-0.27) 
PERIOD 2.119*** 2.144*** 
 (5.52) (5.50) 
ROE_SEO -5.533** -5.685** 
 (-2.31) (-2.32) 
SIZE_SEO -0.238 -0.237 
 (-0.96) (-0.93) 
PB_SEO 0.027 0.034 
 (0.36) (0.44) 
RETFD 0.002 0.002 
 (1.40) (1.33) 
SEOPROED 0.395 0.402 
 (1.63) (1.63) 
YEAR control control 
UNDERWRITER control control 
_cons -16.934*** -17.054*** 
 (-3.18) (-3.16) 
N 356 356 
pseudo R2 0.240 0.256 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This research used the penalty cases of CSRC between 2004 and 2015 
to investigate the effects of penalties on customer loyalty of investment banks. 
We found that customers are more likely to change SEO underwriter if the 
IPO underwrite got punished. Hence, this confirms the research hypothesis of 
this paper. Moreover, for the investment banks with high reputation, this 
negative impact on customer loyalty is more significant.   
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